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T HERE ARE NAMES THAT WE KNOW NOT BECAUSE
of what they did, but because of how they died: Karen Ann
Quinlan, Joseph Saikewicz, Brother Fox, Earle Spring, Claire
Conroy, and William Bartling, to mention some of the most prominent.
We know their names because there was conflict about how they would

die, what medical interventions should be used to prolong their lives,
who should make this decision, and on what basis. We know their

names because representatives of these individuals, families, friends,

and physicians went to court for guidance and protection in making
these decisions. They felt obliged to seek court intervention because
there are no statutes that define the rights of individuals in their

circumstances, and the courts have emerged as the primary public
forum in which issues about medical intervention and the rights of
patients have been debated for the past decade.
This article deals primarily with appellate court decisions regarding
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for elderly
patients. This judicial focus was chosen because the courts have created

almost all of the relevant law in this area by adjudicating individual
cases on the basis of common law and constitutional law principles.
Because of the complex nature of the issues, legislatures and regulatory
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agencies have remained relatively silent. Traditional methods, lik

guardianships and durable powers of attorney, have been used in some

instances, but usually without changing their original, much broad

compass. More recently, adult protection services and public guardianshi

services have developed, but with a much broader agenda. The on

type of legislation directly aimed at the withholding and withdraw

of life-sustaining treatment is "living will" legislation. Although draw

very narrowly to date, the debate on such legislation has helped
inform the public about these issues. Accordingly, we provide bri
descriptions of traditional statutory mechanisms to protect elder
patients, and a detailed analysis of "living will" legislation.

Why Cases Come to Court

In a society dedicated to fostering the ideal of equality and "equ
protection under law," the courts serve to protect individuals fro
exploitation by others. In the area of withholding and withdrawin

life-sustaining treatment, the courts generally have not been involved

in retrospective punishment through criminal proceedings, but ha

increasingly become involved in prospective decisions about treatment

These cases center on enforcing individual rights and establishin
corresponding duties. Such cases have been presented to the cour
for two primary reasons: (1) participants who have already agreed
a course of action want a guarantee of legal immunity before actua
withdrawing or withholding medical treatment (e.g., Earle Spring

and (2) appointment of a legal guardian is sought with specific authori

over a treatment decision because of a dispute between family a

providers over what course of action to take (e.g., Karen Ann Quinlan)

The role of the courts in each type of case is the same: to prote

the rights of the incompetent individual about whose care others
making decisions, and to enforce the rights of competent patients
make their own decisions. The courts do this in a variety of way

including (1) making the process public; (2) appointing individua
to represent the patient in court and in the health care setting; (

'In the Matter of Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).

2In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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using legal principles to decide cases; and
decisions.

Definitional Problems: "Life-sustaining

The President's Commission for the Stud

Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re

that "phrases like 'right to die,' 'right to

'quality of life,' and 'euthanasia' have bee

ways that their meanings, if they ever were

blurred." This problem has been endemic
the treatment of the elderly patient.

The term "life-sustaining treatment," fo
title of this article and used throughout

particularly happy with because of its vague

have used terms like "life prolonging," "li

and similar terms. When examined closely, t

What is the difference between "prolong

If a life is extended for five minutes or fiv

years, has it been "prolonged" or "saved"
because he will imminently die of an iden

has a disease we know will lead to death in
ill? Should the rights of a person be depe

him "terminally ill" or whether we deem hi

as opposed to "life saving"? We have fou
in analyzing the rights of patients. We h

sustaining" reluctantly, although it is so

neutral than the alternate terms. In this arti

means any treatment that extends the lengt

for a minute or for 50 years. It applies

"terminally ill" and whether or not the trea

or "life saving." Thus, while we are not p
term, we frankly could not think of a be

"Withholding" and "withdrawing" are c
have the advantage of being descriptively

correct, but probably less intuitively clear, is

refusal," which conveys the notion that w

of treatment, and a refusal on the part of o
We think it is especially important to note
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between various forms of medical treatment on the basis of their
utility, side effects, number of moving parts, novelty, expense, or on
other grounds. Such distinctions tend to be made on inherently arbitrary

grounds, and detract from focusing on the individual patient, and
his rights and welfare.
Likewise, we do not think it is useful to distinguish among categories

of adults (18 years of age or over) on the basis of age. Thus, while
this article is concerned with elderly patients, it should be emphasized
at the outset that the elderly have neither more nor fewer rights than

the rest of the adult members of society. It is for this reason that,
although a number of cases we discuss do not involve elderly patients,

all of the principles derived from them are directly applicable to the

elderly. The primary factor that compromises one's rights to refuse
treatment is not age, but incompetence, an issue dealt with later in
this article. Definitional problems are also dealt with in more detail
in a later section, where statutory approaches are discussed.

The Right to Refuse Treatment
The Right of a Competent Adult to Refuse Treatment
General Rules. Individuals have a common-law right to be free
from nonconsensual bodily invasions. An unconsented-to invasion is
a battery. As early as 1905 an Illinois court held:
Under a free government at least, the free citizen's first and greatest

right which underlies all others-the right to the inviolability of
his person, in other words, his right to himself-is the subject of
universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician
S. . to violate without permission the bodily integrity of the patient

by a major or capital operation.3

More recently, courts have found that for the patient's consent to be

valid, the physician must provide the patient with enough material

3Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905), affd 224 Ill. 30, 79 N.E. 562

(1905).
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information about the proposed procedure
an "informed consent."4

In essence, the requirement that a physician obtain a patient's
informed consent prior to performing a treatment is designed to ensure

that the patient has some basic information prior to being asked to
make a "go" or "no go" decision regarding treatment. The physician
has specialized knowledge that is essential to the making of a reasoned

decision, and the patient is the party who is to apply some of that
knowledge to his own situation. The California Supreme Court explained

this dyadic relationship as follows:
A medical doctor, being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent
in the procedure he is prescribing, the risks of a decision not to
undergo the treatment, and the probability to a successful outcome
of the treatment. But once this information has been disclosed,
that aspect of the doctor's expert function has been performed. The

weighing of those risks against the individual fears and hopes of
the patient is not an expert skill. Such evaluation and decision is a
non-medical judgment reserved to the patient alone. A patient should be

denied the opportunity to weigh the risks only where it is evident
he cannot evaluate the data, as, for example, where there is an
emergency or the patient is a child or incompetent [emphasis added].5
Courts thus view the decision whether or not to undergo treatment
not as a medical one, but rather as a personal decision by the individual
who will be directly affected. It follows that if a person is empowered

by law to decide to undergo medical treatment, he is also empowered
to decline such treatment. If a person cannot decline treatment, the
"right" to decide whether or not to undergo a treatment becomes a
sham, equivalent to a "right to agree with your doctor."

In addition to the common-law right to refuse treatment, some
courts have recognized a fundamental constitutional right to refuse

treatment. In the Quinlan case, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that the right of privacy enunciated by the

4 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Harnish v. Children's

Hospital, 387 Mass. 152, 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982).
SCobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P. 2d 1 (1972).
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United States Supreme Court "is broad enough to encompass a pat
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances."6
That well-known case involved a young woman who was in a permanent

coma and on a mechanical ventilator. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court concurs in that holding. The case involved a 67-yearold severely retarded ward of the state who had cancer for which
chemotherapy offered the only chance for a remission.7 Where the
right to refuse treatment is seen as a fundamental constitutional right,

a state's authority to abridge the right is very narrow, and must be
based on demonstrating a "compelling state interest." Four potentially

compelling state interests were mentioned by both the Quinlan and
Saikewicz courts: (1) protecting human life; (2) preventing suicide;
(3) protecting innocent third parties; and (4) protecting the integrity
of the medical profession. In neither of these cases, however, were
any of these state interests found sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the right of the individual patient, as exercised by a proxy. The proxy

could withhold chemotherapy (in the case of Joseph Saikewicz) or
withdraw mechanical ventilation (in the case of Karen Ann Quinlan),
both of which could prolong their lives (Annas 1979, 373-75).
"Life-sustaining" Treatments.' Jehovah's Witness blood transfusion cases.

The right to refuse treatment is not limited to those patients for
whom such a refusal would be of little or no significance. A close
reading of the case law makes it apparent that competent adults who
seriously express a desire to refuse treatment are permitted to do so,
even when such a refusal would result in death.

The early cases in this area of the law almost invariably involve
Jehovah's Witnesses who need blood transfusions in order to survive.
When one analyzes the facts of the various cases, it becomes readily
apparent that these are not forced treatment of competent patient
cases. Perhaps the most famous and widely cited case is Application
of the President and Directors of Georgetown College.8 In this case, a 25year-old mother of a seven-month-old child was brought to the hospital

6In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).

7Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
8 Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F. 2d 1000

(D.C. Cir. 1964).
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with a bleeding ulcer, having lost two-thirds o
patient and her husband were Jehovah's Witn

prohibits the injection of blood into the bo

religious tenet is applied, however, is subject to
when the judge in this case spoke to the husban

"He advised me that on religious grounds he w
blood transfusion for his wife. He said, howe

ordered the transfusion, the responsibility w
then went to the patient's room and found: "
woman was not in a mental condition to make
asked the patient if "she would oppose the blo
court allowed it. She indicated, as best I could

would not then be her responsibility." The cour

with a competent patient who opposed transfu

court, but rather with a patient who could not

to it. The court's decision cannot be construed
a patient who refuses it: the patient and her h
to place this responsibility on the court's shou

Although a petition for a rehearing en banc was

reasons, a number of judges expressed the op
judge who decided this case had no authority
he did have such authority, that his decision was

(later Chief Justice) Burger asked in his opinio
objections to that treatment based on religiou

rejects the medical opinion, are the courts em

him?" He later answers this question by st

myriads of problems and troubles which judges ar

and this is as it should be. Some matters of essent

and others of enormous public concern are beyon

Another so-called "forced treatment" case in
father of two who had lost 60 to 65 percent
and refused to consent to a transfusion.9 Accor
patient was competent and rational. When t
hospital room, the first thing the patient saidany questions-was that he would not agree to
would in no way resist if the court ordered it

9 United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (Conn.
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court ordered the transfusion it would be the court's will and not

his-the responsibility for the act would be "on the court's conscience."

The judge explained that he had no power to order the transfusion
and the patient would be free to resist the transfusion by putting his

hand over the site where the needle would be inserted. Mr. George
responded that he would in no way resist the transfusion once the
judge signed the order.
These cases can be compared to one in which a 34-year-old father
of two who was seriously injured refused necessary blood transfusions. 1o

Mr. Osbourne told the judge that if the court ordered him to be
transfused, he would be deprived of "everlasting life." The patient
said: "It is between me and Jehovah, not the courts. ... I'm willing
to take my chances. My faith is that strong. I wish to live but with
no blood transfusions. Now get that straight." No transfusion was
ordered.

These examples illustrate that it is essential to distinguish between

cases in which people truly refuse treatment, and those in which
people refuse to consent affirmatively to treatment, but are willing
to voluntarily undergo or "assent" to treatment if ordered by a judge.
Ordering treatment in the former case violates the individual's privacy

rights, while in the latter case there is no such violation.
Unfortunately, much of our modern jurisprudence regarding the
refusal of medical treatment is based on a misinterpretation of these

and other early Jehovah's Witness cases. They were often initially
decided in an emergency situation in which adequate deliberation is
necessarily precluded. They were unusual in the sense that the courts
are dealing with patients who seem to have anomalously consented
to very serious physical invasions, such as major surgery, but not to
the much less serious intrusion of blood transfusions. The amount of

invasion the court "orders" is, therefore, much less than the patient
has already consented to. None of the patients affirmatively refused
to have the transfusions, and many seem to have believed that their

religion forbade consent to blood transfusions, but not transfusions
ordered by the court. Finally, none of these early cases dealt with the

constitutional right of privacy, which has played such an important
role in the contemporary cases.

o?In re Osbourne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Life-sustaining Treatments: Representative Modern

Witness cases continue to come to court, more

involve elderly patients who wish to refuse mo

on nonreligious grounds. An example is In re
Quackenbush was a 72-year-old man who refused

legs amputated. "His conversation did wander o
greater extent than would be expected of a 72

circumstances." He had shunned medical treatm

years. He was neither terminally ill nor co

operations, he would live indefinitely, but not
would lead to his death. The court in this case

the state's interest in preservation of life is not s

to override Mr. Quackenbush's right of privacy

his own future "regardless of the absence of a
courts, like those in Massachusetts and Califo
same conclusion using similar reasoning. 12

Contemporary courts have indicated that for
the finding of a "good prognosis" is insufficien
with the power forcibly to treat these individ

prognosis is "good" is not a medical issue, and
of being resolved by an objective test. Rather
or bad based on a subjective evaluation of the
Thus, Mr. Quackenbush's life would have been
had been amputated. While this may seem lik
to physicians or judges, it did not seem like a
Mr. Quackenbush. It is seldom, if ever, prope
its view of what a "good" prognosis is on a co
right to refuse medical treatment is not cond

finding, or not finding, that the proposed treatm

it is based on the right of each citizen to ma

health care decisions without interference by the

of a demonstrable "compelling state interest."

SIn re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282 (1978).
12 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 197

Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 19
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Protecting the Rights of Incompetent Patients to
Refuse Treatment

Substantive principles. Of course, individuals cannot actually be

determining after they become incompetent and lose their ca

for self-determination. Nonetheless, the proposition that an incom

patient should be afforded the "right of self-determination" h

exercise if competent, insofar as possible, has been upheld by

court examining the issue since Quinlan. For example, the Massach

Supreme Judicial Court has strongly declared that the right to re

treatment must extend to incompetent as well as competent p

"because the value of human dignity extends to both. "'3 Court
probably come to no other conclusion without seriously under

the rights of the weakest members of society: the mentally incom

who are unable to protect their own interests. It is critical
protection of liberty for all of us that our basic rights continue

respected after we are no longer able to protect them ourselv
legal scholar Ronald Dworkin (1978) has argued:

The bulk of the law-that part which defines and implements so

economic and foreign policy--cannot be neutral. It must sta
its greatest part, the majority's view of the common good
institution of rights is therefore crucial, because it represen

majority's promise to the minorities that their dignity and equ

will be respected. When the divisions among the groups are
violent, then this gesture, if law is to work, must be most s

. . . [Taking rights seriously] is the one feature that distingu
law from ordered brutality.

In this regard, the law protects the "dignity and equali

incompetent patients by attempting to honor, in some measur

right to self-determination. Since dignity and equality exten
human beings, respect for the rights of self-determination ca
limited by medical diagnosis (e.g., Alzheimer's disease) or me

prognosis (e.g., irreversibly comatose or vegetative), but should ex

to all incompetent persons. The challenge is to devise a reaso

13Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
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mechanism to discern what their wishes would
fact exercise self-determination.

Substituted judgment. Since, by definition, an
is unable to exercise his or her own self-deter
decisions regarding treatment, this right must

of the incompetent person by someone else or
avoid loss of this right, the surrogate should u
judgment" standard, i.e., the surrogate should
effort to make the treatment decision in the manner in which the

patient himself would have made it if competent, provided there is
sufficient evidence on which to base such a determination. As previously
noted, the patient's choice concerning treatment is the primary relevant

variable when we are dealing with a competent patient. Therefore,
in order to afford the incompetent the right to self-determination,
we must focus on the patient's previously expressed desires concerning
treatment as the most critical factor in affording the now incompetent

patient the right of choice, using other factors like lifestyle, values,
and religious beliefs where relevant. The primacy of the "substituted

judgment" test was recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Quinlan, even in the absence of a clear declaration on Karen Quinlan's

part, by granting the power to the "guardian and family of Karen
to render their best judgment . . . as to whether she would exercise
[her right to refuse treatment] in these circumstances."'4
Preference for the substituted judgment test has been legally acknowledged by other courts dealing with the issue, and endorsed for

both legal and ethical reasons by the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (1983). In the Saikewicz case, for example, even though the
patient had never made any decisions for himself, the court required
a determination of the patient's own "actual interests and preferences"

in ascertaining what decision the incompetent person himself would
make if he could speak for himself:
The decision in cases such as this should be that which would be

made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent,
but taking into account the present and future incompetency of

141n re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), 41.
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the individual as one of the factors which would necessarilY enter
into the decision-making process of the competent person.

The New York Court of Appeals, in the "Brother Fox" case, was
able to avoid many troubling issues by focusing on the individual's
right to make his own decision. Brother Fox, an 83-year-old member
of the Society of Mary, who, following routine hernia surgery, was
left in a permanent vegetative state on a mechanical ventilator, had

previously expressed an oral desire not to be maintained by "extraordinary

means" if he were ever in a situation like Karen Ann Quinlan. As
the court noted, the issue of whether or not someone else can speak
for the patient "is not presented in this case because here Brother Fox
made the decision for himself before he became incompetent."'6 Since,

unlike the more casual statements of Karen Quinlan, Brother Fox's

prior statements of desires were "obviously solemn pronouncements,"

the court ruled that they must be followed. As the New York court

properly noted, prior declarations can provide "clear and convincing"

evidence of a person's wishes, and in the absence of evidence to the

contrary should be considered the best evidence of the declarant's
actual preferences.

The President's Commission has likewise argued that whenever
possible "decisionmaking for incapacitated patients should be guided
by the principle of substituted judgment." The commission argued
that this was morally and legally necessary to respect the person's

autonomy by permitting the person the ultimate authority to determine

for himself the meaning of health and well-being. Since individuals
frequently disagree on these concepts, the person with the greatest
interest in how they are determined, i.e., the patient himself, should
be afforded the right to have the final say when possible. While we

strongly agree that the substituted-judgment test is the primary and
preferred test, we should note that in the absence of some competent

prior expression by the patient, it is subject to abuse. The case of
Mary Hier provides an example.
At the time her case was first heard in court, Mary Hier was a 92-

" Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).

16 Matter ofJohn Storar, In the Matter of Philip Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
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year-old woman who suffered from senile d

the Queen of England, and had been institu

fifty years. Based primarily on the fact that sh

tube (through which she received all her no

unable to take food orally) a lower court ju

would reject such artificial feeding if she wer

Ironically, it is only by attributing compet

an incompetent, aged, mentally ill, nursin
courts could justify not replacing the gastr
appeals court pictured her as a competent p

Mrs. Hier's repeated dislodgments of gastr
to attempts to insert a nasogastric tube,
surgery all may be seen as a plea for priv
by a 92-year-old person who is seriously i

little left to offer.

As this example illustrates, with a patient w

expressed a preference, "substituted judgme

alization to mistreat or terminate treatmen

desirable or difficult in some way. Luckily fo

ad litem, Robert LeDeux, succeeded in retu
and getting the court to order the gastrost
on new evidence. Mrs. Hier is alive as of t

Best interests. In cases in which it is n

reasonably or accurately the patient's choic
should always be the primary test used to
avenues are open to us: either we adopt a r

treatment can never be discontinued; or we pe

of treatment under certain clearly specifie
found the former rule too rigid and not p
patients, since competent individuals can and

ments. The latter rule, however, requires care

potential abuses. Under the parens patriae d
that surrogates make decisions for incompe

the best interests of the incompetent. Cases in

17 In re Mary Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200 (198
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test must be used include not only those in which previously competent

adults have not expressed a preference regarding treatment decisions,
but also all cases of individuals who have never been competent to express

such a preference: young children and the severely mentally retarded.

The dangers of treating elderly patients using an "always treat" rule

are well illustrated by the New York case of John Storar.'8
John Storar was a profoundly retarded 52-year-old resident of a
state facility who had a mental age of about 18 months. His closest
relative was his mother, a 77-year-old widow who lived near the
facility and visited him almost daily. In July 1979 he was diagnosed
as having cancer of the bladder, and his mother was appointed his

legal guardian to consent to radiation therapy, which produced a

remission. Internal bleeding began again in March 1980, and his
bladder was cauterized in an unsuccessful attempt to stop the bleeding.

In addition, the cancer metastasized to his lungs, and his condition
was considered inoperable and terminal. Nonetheless, in May the
physicians asked the mother for permission to administer blood transfusions. She reluctantly agreed, but in June asked that the transfusions,

which were given every two weeks, be discontinued because of the
distress they caused her son. Because the physicians believed Mr.
Storar would eventually bleed to death without the transfusions, they

sought a court order to do them, even though with the transfusions

they agreed he had only three to six months to live because of the
cancer. The trial court agreed with the mother on the basis that it
thought she was in the best position to determine what her son would

want. The New York Court of Appeals, unfortunately and we believe

wrongly, reversed the decision and ordered the blood transfusions
continued.

The Storar court incorrectly determined that a medical treatment
decision for a terminally ill, adult, mentally retarded person had to
be made on the same basis as if the adult was a curable child who

would live a normal life after a blood transfusion. Accordingly, the
court held that it was always in the incompetent patient's best interest
to continue to receive blood transfusions even when the transfusions

merely painfully prolonged the dying process for him. This analysis

'8 Matter ofJohn Storar, In the Matter of Philip Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
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is manifestly incorrect since Storar was d

heart was surely in the right place, but it

not follow. It very properly wanted to p

incompetents from those who would deny th

treatment for reasons other than the pati

failed to recognize that there may be times w

prolongs suffering and is, therefore, itself c

any test that parents, families, or trial co

it is ever legally permissible to withhold
from this category of patients.

The "best interests" test arguably promotes

in the absence of any idiosyncracy or a p

contrary, it can be fairly assumed that the p

a decision consistent with his own objective b

the best interests test is an objective test

most reasonable individuals in society wo
same or similar circumstances. For examp
noted that a decision by Karen's parents
respirator would be in her own best intere
rationale: "This decision should be accepte
whelming majority of whose members w
circumstances, exercise such a choice in th
or for those closest to them."''19 Of course,

the core of the best interests test is aimed

welfare, as objectively viewed by society a
But there are conceptual problems. In C

New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to art

interests" tests. Under the "limited objec
treatment may be withdrawn if "there is
that the patient would have refused the tr

that the burdens of the patient's continue
outweigh the benefits of that life for him."

test" (i.e., when there is no evidence abou

want) "the net burdens of the patient's life w

clearly outweigh the benefits that the pa
[and) the recurring, unavoidable and sever

19In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
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with the treatment should be such that the effect of admini

life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane.'20
As to the "limited test," if there is "some trustworthy evid

it should be followed if sufficient and ignored if insufficient. Se

this light, it is simply another way of expressing the "subs
judgment" test. The "pure objective test," focusing exclusive

"recurring, unavoidable and severe pain" as the only basis for with

or withdrawing treatment, is far too narrow. There may be
things like impossibility of recovery, and the use of restrai
addition to pain, that objectively make continued treatment

burdensome than beneficial to the patient. Such a test tends to ig

the plight of the individual patient, by justifying actions that ot

could not objectively be viewed as in their "best interests."
Procedural Mechanisms. Once the substantive principles are

upon (i.e., that we want to follow the wishes of the patient if rea

possible, and, if these cannot be ascertained, then we want t
that action which is in the patient's "best interests"), what r
is developing a procedure that ascertains the patient's wishes

interests accurately, fairly, efficiently, and in a manner that is so

acceptable (Cramton 1982). Courts have become the primary
in which both substantive and procedural guidelines are being
and defined. The reason is not that courts are more intelligen
physicians, families, or other third parties. The reason is simp
judges (and not physicians, families, or others) have a social m
to distill the values and morals of society on which most of
cases must ultimately be decided (Annas 1979, 384). In the w

of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo (1921, 135-36):

You may say that there is no assurance that judges will int
the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other m
am not disposed to deny this, but in my view it is quite b
the point. The point is rather that this power of interpre
must be lodged somewhere, and the custom of the Constit
has lodged it in the judges. If they are to fulfill their func

judges, it could hardly be lodged elsewhere. Their concl

must, indeed, be subject to constant testing and retesting, r
and readjustment; but if they act with conscience and intell

20 In the Matter of Claire Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).

This content downloaded from
128.197.229.194 on Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:29:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rights of Elderly Patients III

they ought to attain in their conclusions

wisdom.

The mechanisms courts use to determine incompetency and patient
preferences, appoint guardians, determine the authority of guardians,

and grant legal immunity, are explored in the next section.

The Role of Competence in Decisions to Refuse
Life-sustaining Treatment
American law properly presumes that every competent adult is at
liberty to consent to or refuse any proposed medical treatment or
intervention. A further appropriate legal presumption is that all adults
are competent, and the burden of proof is on those who would declare

them incompetent. Accordingly, competence has become a central
issue in all discussions of the "right to refuse treatment" (Annas and
Densberger 1984).
Unfortunately, as individuals age, the reality is that health care
providers, family members, and others are more likely to conclude
that actions that would not indicate incompetence at a younger age,
all of a sudden do in the elderly. This is not a new problem. Sophocles's

sons brought a proceeding against him to obtain his property, and
supported their argument that he was a lunatic on the basis of his
preoccupation with writing his play, Oedipus at Colonus. In his defense,
Sophocles read from the play and asked the jury if it seemed the work
of an imbecile. The jury reportedly applauded the reading and declared

Sophocles competent. One modern legal commentator opines that,
under contemporary statutes, use of this defense could result in the
sons walking out of the courtroom "in control of his property" (Atkinson

1979). Indeed, many states retain "advanced age" as sufficient grounds

for appointment of a conservator over one's property. It was only in
1976 in California and 1978 in Illinois that an individual could not
be found incompetent merely because he was "old and sick" (Atkinson
1979).

Society does not view all ages as having equal value, and generally
holds the "demented aged in low esteem" (Cassel and Jameton 1981).
Physicians are likely to mirror this societal prejudice. For example,
Earle Spring was a 77-year-old man in a nursing home with irreversible
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kidney disease and severe senile dementia. At a hearing to de

whether or not to discontinue his renal dialysis, his dialysis physi

testified that in determining whether or not it is appropria
continue dialysis treatment he considers "whether a person is

person, whether the person is happy to be alive, whether other pe

around him or her are happy to have him alive [emphasis added)." 2

loose and subjective quality-of-life standards are clearly inappropr

Even though the evidence of Mr. Spring's actual wishes rega

continuation of kidney dialysis was virtually nonexistent, the
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court nonetheless affirmed a lowe
decision that Mr. Spring would, "if competent, choose not to r
the life prolonging treatment." What really seemed to be at
was the court's (and society's?) view that older people in Mr. S
condition, by virtue of their physical and mental limitations,

have much to live for. The family testimony, for example,
the effect that Mr. Spring had led a vigorous, active life, wh
was no longer able to do. The fact, of course, is that it is alm
always true that as people get older, their level of activity de

and is often severely curtailed. It does not follow from this, howe

that such a person would prefer to be dead.

Because of such prejudice, the aged may be treated not as compe

adults, but as incompetent children. The medical presumptio
often be that the aged are presumed incompetent to refuse m
treatment until they can demonstrate to the physician's satisf
that they are competent.
In this context, a competence proceeding, and the subsequen
pointment of a guardian, can be used as a weapon against the e
The results can be devastating. Reduced to the status of a ch
the eyes of the law, "most statutes deprive the ward of the ri
buy or sell property, to contract, to sue and be sued, to make
to write checks, and generally to engage in financial transact
any kind . . . of the right to vote, to marry, to operate a m
vehicle, and to consent to or refuse medical treatment" (Hor

1975; Regan 1981).

Because of the centrality of a competence determination to indi

self-determination and well-being, it is critical that those ass
21 In the Matter of Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (quotation taken

lower court transcript).
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competence have a clear understanding of its legal meanin

the individual whose competence is being questioned be a
process of law. Due process, however, is meaningless if
of competence itself is not well understood and articula
regard the courts have consistently utilized the notion of
as a capacity to perform certain tasks and have been wil
individuals competent to perform some tasks (e.g., to d
to live) while incompetent to perform others (e.g., to giv
home or all of one's belongings). In the medical context
concluded that the most reasonable way to conceptualize

will be to ascertain the individual's capacity to understand an

the information needed to give an informed consent or a

refusal to the treatment under consideration. Thus, capa

portioned to the seriousness of the decision, although what o

to be at stake is the degree of certainty courts require
incapacity to perform a specific task. The less important
terms of its consequences to the individual, the more c
require to find someone incompetent to perform it.

Definition of Competence
Informed Consent and Competence

The informed consent doctrine requires that a patient be giv

information (information that might influence a patien
about his condition, the proposed treatment (including i
benefits), and its alternatives (Annas, Glantz, and Katz

Implemented in good faith by the physician, informed cons

both self-determination and rational decision making. It
that an informed patient has sufficient information on w

a decision to accept or reject proposed treatment. Thus, it is

to assess the patient's capacity to understand and apprec
formation required to be disclosed so that we can be con
the patient's decision when he makes it.

Infants and comatose patients provide clear examples
who are incapable of making decisions regarding medical

are equally obvious cases where the patient is capable of m
decisions. Unfortunately, there are also many borderline
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the perspective of the physician, who wants both to honor the pa

wishes (respect autonomy) and deliver good medical care (pr
the patient's well-being), when these two objectives seem to co

There are, for example, cases in which the capacity of elderly pat

to participate in the medical decision-making process appears questi

or where the physician believes that the patient's refusal is not ref

of his own values and preferences, but is instead a product of psych

or sociological factors. Such cases are dealt with in a variety o

with varying degrees of arbitrariness, including sincere attem
determine patient competence objectively.

Approaches to Competence

A variety of approaches have been suggested to determine compet

The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Proble
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1982) identi

three: outcome, status, and function. Under the outcome approach

decisions by patients which do not reflect community values a

as evidence of incompetence. Under the status approach, an indivi

competence is based solely on his physical or mental statu

consciousness, age, mental or physical diagnosis). The functioning a

focuses on the individual's actual understanding and processes in de

making situations.
Most commentators have assumed that the functioning appr
the correct approach, and have tried to define better the att

needed to function competently. One philosopher has suggest

example, that we can require any one of four increasingly strict sta

(1) free action, which involves a voluntary and intentional c

(2) authentic decision, which is a decision that reflects the individ

values; (3) effective deliberation, which is an evaluation of the spe

alternatives and their consequences; and (4) moral reflection,
is, in addition to effective deliberation, reflection on and acce
of the moral values upon which the decision is based (Miller

Two psychiatrists used an analogous classification of increasingly d

tests and suggested the following four possible tests: (1) evid

a choice; (2) evidencing an understanding of relevant issues; (3) ra

manipulating the relevant information; and (4), in addition to
(3), an appreciation of the nature of the situation. In their w
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"[4appreciation is distinct from factual understan

the subject to consider the relevance to his im

those facts he has understood previously in the a

and Lidz 1977). The authors regard this as th
It is also the most reasonable one and, if fairl
is most appropriate in hospital and nursing ho

A "functioning" approach, incorporating the app

avoids the pitfalls of second-guessing an individu

in the authentic-decision and moral-reflection
approach also helps ensure that the decision th

he realizes will have consequences for himself tha

finds desirable or acceptable. In addition, the
pedigree in the context of treatment refusals.

The functioning test, including the appreci

the one most often used by the courts, and was t

major cases of refusal of life-saving amputatio

The cases were decided by appeals courts in Massa

about the same time, 1978, and did not ref

Massachusetts case involved Mrs. Candura, a 7
a diabetic who was suffering from gangrene
lower leg.22 She had undergone two previous

a portion of her right foot) and at the time of t

an arterial bypass had been performed in an a
probability of recurrences of gangrene. Her at

ommended that the leg be amputated with
vacillation, she refused the operation and per
The trial court held that Mrs. Candura was:

incapable of making a rational and competent choice to undergo
or reject the proposed surgery to her right leg. To this extent her
behavior is irrational. She has closed her mind to the entire issue
to the extent that the court cannot conclude that her decision to
reject further treatment is rational and informed.

The trial court concentrated on its finding that she had "closed her

mind" and the court thus seemed to focus on "autonomy as effective

22 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978).
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deliberation." Ultimately, however, this appears to have been l
important to the trial court than her actual decision which the c
characterized as "irrational," thus falling into the "outcome appro

trap. The appeals court, on the other hand, concentrated on her abil

to "appreciate" her situation and its alternatives. The appeals c
reversed the trial court's decision and stated that "Mrs. Candura's

decision may be regarded by most as unfortunate, but on the record
in this case it is not the uninformed decision of a person incapable
of appreciating the nature and consequences of her act [emphasis added]."

The court noted that "[u]ntil she changed her original decision and
withdrew her consent to the amputation, her competence was not
questioned." The doctors readily accepted her consent to the two
initial amputations, and only questioned it when she disagreed with
their judgment about her treatment. The court made it clear that
competence is not to be judged by a standard of medical rationality,
that is, what her physicians consider the only reasonable decision.
Rather, the relevant factors were her understanding of the proposed
operation and the consequences of refusing it. According to the court,

"[Mrs. Candura] has made it clear that she does not wish to have the
operation even though that decision will in all likelihood lead shortly
to her death."

In an enlightening footnote, the court noted that one of the two
psychiatrists who testified at the trial thought Mrs. Candura was
competent. Asked why he differed from the other psychiatrist, he
replied, "I think it is just a personal philosophy type of thing where
I believe persons ought to be given the benefit of the doubt as to
what they want to do with their lives, whereas, Dr. Kelley, I guess,
is more protective." The point is not which psychiatrist was "correct,"

but that they differed over the issue of the appropriate criteria for
competence, based on their own "philosophical" views. It also points
to the importance of physicians understanding and respecting the legal

definition of competence. Because of the "philosophy" of a particular
psychiatrist, Mrs. Candura was deprived of her right to make her
own decisions by the trial court. Obviously this type of testimony

will not be very useful to a court or other decision maker charged
with determining an individual's competence on the basis of the
standard legal test.
The Tennessee case involving Mary Northern is similar, although
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in that case the court found the 72-yearconsent to or refuse amputation.23 As a r

Mary Northern's feet were necrotic. The
"shriveled, rotting and stinking." Accord

Northern was perfectly lucid and understood
condition of her feet. She believed her feet

and refused to consider the possibility th
the amputation. Because she would not ex
she would rather die than have her feet
"possibly" when that question was put to
that she was refusing to make a choice, a
of comprehending the facts which constit
The court used the following definition to

Capacity means mental ability to make
includes the ability to perceive, appreciat
reach a rational judgment upon such fac

The court did not adopt the "outcome te

to her refusal per se. Rather it was her ca

decision that the court objected to: "On
amputation of her feet, her comprehens

dimmed to the extent that she is incapable o

would be obvious to a person of normal perc

major fact Ms. Northern consistently wa

was that her feet were "dead, black, shriv
As Judge Drowota wrote in a concurring

If this Court could in good faith find th
that her feet do look and smell as they
are telling her that she needs surgery t
not interfere with whatever decision sh

much it conflicted with the substance of he

what we ourselves might have chosen.

The judicial test of competence is based
capacity to understand and appreciate the

23 Department of Human Services v. Northern
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one's decisions. It can be restated in the medical care context b

saying that if an individual understands and appreciates the information
needed to give an informed consent, then that individual is competent

to give both an informed consent and to refuse consent, assuming,

of course, that the decision is made freely and voluntarily. The typ

and quantity of information that must be understood and appreciate

will vary with the actual treatment options, and the risks and alternative

that face the patient, but not with the status of the patient (statu
test) or the actual decision made by the patient (outcome test).
Relation of Competence to Other Factors

Use of the "outcome approach" by physicians, as in the Candura case

is probably the rule rather than the exception. Typically, competenc
is questioned only when a patient refuses to consent to a recommended

treatment. Testimony before the President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research

(1982, 61) is consistent with this view: "Coherent adults are seldom
said to lack capacity (except, perhaps, in the mental health context)
when they acquiesce in the course of treatment recommended by their

physician."
Without a specific, consistent basis for questioning and determining

competence, the patient's refusal-an easily identifiable target for
criticism because it conflicts with the physician's view of the patient's

well-being-can easily become a justification for paternalism. This
may result in the substitution of the physician's own judgment and
values for those of the patient, including the physician's conception
of a "good" or "bad" decision. The physician may also attempt to
establish a cause-effect relation between some kind of mental or physical

factor (e.g., depression or blood loss) and the undesirable decision,
thus enabling him to invalidate that decision on "medical" grounds
and to proceed with his own decision.
A patient's age alone should never be a sufficient basis for a declaration

of incompetence. But there are complicating factors. A patient may
vacillate in a decision to accept or refuse treatment. This by itself
does not constitute incompetence, but a patient who vacillates poses
a problem to the physician attempting to discern what the patient
wants. One sound approach is to incorporate a reasonable waiting
period for nonemergency cases into the competence assessment, such
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as the case of an elderly person with a noneme

so that the patient's actual desires can be as

The difficulty in formulating policy for t
in determining what constitutes a "reasonab

before making a judgment as to the pat

question persists, treatment cannot be forc
is made (either at the bedside or in court) that

to make the decision regarding his care

Treatment can continue, however, if the pa

This is because it is a much lesser harm to libe

to which the patient has at least assented
against a person's will.

Another potential complicating factor is men

of mental illness does not always constitute
it may. In one famous lower court decision, a

woman refused surgery for breast cancer.2
indicated that the operation would interfere

affecting her ability to have babies, and would

Her caseworker testified, however, that ba

her six months previously, at the time she
informed and she was "conscious of the con
The judge concluded that although her refu
foolish to an outside observer," and althoug

by delusions," the delusions do not appear t
for rejecting surgery. Accordingly, he up
"her original understanding but irrational d
health care providers have an obligation to

understanding wishes of their patients, eve
become delusional or suffer other mental
current competence into question.

On the other hand, the Northern case, dis
example where a specific delusion will be s

incompetence where the delusion concerns fac

decision (in that case, the inability to appre

necrotic, and that she would probably die if t

The limited amount of literature on treat
24 In re Yetter, Northampton Co. Orphans Ct.,
(Pa. 1973).
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a heavy emphasis on the difficulties of dealing with a patient's "tr

feelings of despair and hopelessness" and feelings of depr

Depression may often be a perfectly understandable and healthy re

to catastrophic disease or injury. Moods affect the patient's d

making capability, but do not necessarily render the patient com

incapable of making decisions regarding his or her care at all
Moods such as depression and anger are fairly common am
patients who may be heavily medicated and away from their
in strange environments, and separated from their loved one

separation and isolation is, of course, the condition of alm

elderly patients in nursing homes. It is understandable that one m

feel depressed under such circumstances. Elderly patients in
nursing home situations are also likely to be devalued by phy
and even some courts.

Seriously injured persons, such as those suffering spinal cord injuries

or serious burns, may experience shock, grief, pain, depression, and
adverse psychological effects from powerful drugs. Sometimes such
feelings can be effectively treated with "supportive psychotherapy" or
antidepressant drugs. If these treatments are indicated and not refused

by the patient, it is certainly appropriate to pursue them. On the
other hand, if the competent patient refuses such treatment and persists

in a refusal of treatment, that refusal should be honored. The relevant

question is whether a mood such as depression has become so severe
as to undermine one's ability to understand and appreciate the nature
and consequences of one's decisions. If it has not, it alone does not
justify a determination of incompetence.

Appointment of a Legal Guardian for an
Incompetent Person
Method of Appointment
Legal guardians can only be appointed by courts, and the requirements
for such appointment are set forth in state statutes. The state's power
to grant authority over an individual to a guardian is part of its parens
patriae authority (a term derived from the English common law concept

of the King's role as father of the country). The notion is that the
state will provide a "father" or guardian for incompetents, formally
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limited to "idiots" and "lunatics." In co

jury of twelve determined the mental sta

incompetent were determined by the jury to

committed him to the care of some friend

with which to care for him" (Hortsman 1975

provide for a formal hearing before a jud

can be expedited and completed in less

emergency medical situation in which a temp

for the purpose of making a medical treat
Almost all of the most well-known cases
in treatment refusal or withdrawal circumstances have involved the

appointment of a legal guardian for the elderly person who has been
judicially declared incompetent. This has been the case, for example,
in the Northern and Candura (although reversed on appeal) cases, as
well as the cases of Earle Spring (77 years old, withdrawal of kidney
dialysis); Brother Fox (80-year-old comatose individual, withdrawal
of ventilator); Claire Conroy (80-year-old severely demented individual,
withdrawal of artificial nutrition); and Joseph Saikewicz (67 years old,
refusal of chemotherapy for cancer). If incompetent persons must have
guardians appointed for them to dispose of property, it certainly seems

appropriate for guardians to be required for treatment decisions that
pose serious risks to the individual or have life or death consequences.
The first major guardianship case did not involve an elderly person,

although the age of Karen Quinlan was not a factor in the court's
decision. Karen's father sought appointment as Karen's guardian for
the purpose of ordering her mechanical ventilator removed. The hospital

and physicians had informed him that they would not remove the
ventilator. The lower court judge refused to appoint Mr. Quinlan the
guardian, or to grant any guardian the authority to remove the ventilator.

The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed this, and awarded legal
guardianship to Karen's father. It disagreed with the lower court that
his closeness to Karen might cause him anguish and distort his "decision-

making process." Instead the court held:
While Mr. Quinlan feels a natural grief, and understandably sorrows
because of the tragedy which has befallen his daughter, his strength
of purpose and character far outweighs these sentiments and qualifies
him eminently for guardianship of the person . .. of his daughter.25

25 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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The court also noted that next of kin were statutorily prefe

guardianship, and there was "no valid reason" to negate this pr
in refusal of treatment cases.

Authority of Legal Guardian in Treatment Refusals
Guardians have the legal authority to refuse all types of medical interventions when such refusal is based on what the ward would want

(substituted judgment) or on the best interests of the ward (when
applying the substituted judgment test is not possible). On the other
hand, in some jurisdictions, guardians may not have the authority to
consent to certain types of treatment, like sterilization and use of
psychotropic drugs where conflicts of interest may exist.
For example, in Massachusetts it has been determined that a guardian

cannot consent to the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs

for either an outpatient26 or an inpatient.27 The courts based their
rulings on the findings that antipsychotic medication has "devastating

and often irreversible" side effects, that the treatment is extremely

intrusive, and that guardians (such as parents) may be in a conflict
of interest because they derive benefit from the control of the patient's

behavior. Because of these findings, these courts concluded that only
courts, not guardians, could authorize the forcible use of antipsychotic
medications.

Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that only a
court, not a guardian, could authorize the sterilization of an incompetent.28 What these courts have done is to decide that certain procedures

are either too risky, or so subject to abuse, or both, that courts must
oversee their use. It is far from clear what the impact of such cases

might have on the treatment-withholding or treatment-withdrawing
cases. The Grady case is interesting because it was decided by the

Quinlan court. In Quinlan, the court specifically held that judicial
intervention in treatment-withdrawal cases was neither necessary nor
desirable. It then decided Grady, a case that required court involvement

to sterilize incompetent people. Following Grady, the New Jersey

26 Guardianship of Richard Roe, 385 Mass. 415 (1981).
27 Rogers v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489 (1983).
28 In the Matter of Lee Ann Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
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court decided Conroy which, like Quinlan,
thorization to withhold treatment (althoug

vention of an ombudsman and court-appointed

that courts are willing and able to carve o
that guardians are empowered to consent
medical treatment for their wards. They h
the general treatment-withholding or trea
but could do so in the future if abuses bec
of interest exist. In addition, there has be

concerning the guardian's authority to provok

The Quinlan case is again the best exam

Quinlan the guardian of his daughter, the
his authority regarding the termination of

with "full power to make decisions with rega

treating physicians." Other courts have fo
responding to a request for a judgment th
pointment of a guardian, and asks for spec
authority to terminate treatment. Alternat
have already been appointed for other rea
court for specific authority to order the r
treatment.

For example, in the case of Mrs. Edna Marie Leach, a 70

housewife with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, her husband firs

guardianship (after Mrs. Leach's physician refused to honor his

to remove her from the ventilator), and then separately sough

order as guardian to have all life-support systems removed
wife (and ward). The court granted the guardian's request,
under certain conditions, and only after a hearing at which
guardian ad litem was appointed to argue on Mrs. Leach's

Likewise, in the case of Bertha Colyer, a 69-year-old hear

victim who was resuscitated only to wind up in a persistent ve

state, her husband and legal guardian sought a court orde
her removed from the ventilator. In that case the Suprem

Washington held specifically that while a court always
involved in appointing a legal guardian, the statutory aut

29 Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio
Pleas, 1980).
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such guardians in Washington "enables a guardian to use
judgment and exercise, when appropriate, an incompetent
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment." The court ma
that once the guardian was appointed "the courts need not be

in the substantive decision to refuse life-sustaining treatm

We believe it is fair to characterize the Colyer court's s
as "the law." Specifically, only a court can appoint a legal
However, once a legal guardian is appointed, that guardian
the decision to order withdrawal of life-sustaining treatm
basis of substituted judgment, or, if the ward's wishes are
on the basis of the ward's best interests. With the exc
psychotropic drugs and sterilization, no court has held othe

all courts that have ruled on the substantive issue of whether tr

may be withdrawn in a particular instance have done so

request of a physician, family member, legal guardian, or s
third party.

Whether or not the appointment of a "legal guardian" is always
required to authorize the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining

treatment from an incompetent person is a difficult question. There
are some circumstances where the benefits from continued treatment

are either nonexistent or so extremely slight that some courts have
indicated that appointment of a guardian is unnecessary if a close
family member acts in the name of the patient. This makes good
sense. The issue has, however, only been directly discussed in three

cases, all of which involved patients like Karen Ann Quinlan who
were in (or nearly in) persistent vegetative states, and thus had no
reasonable possibility of regaining consciousness.
The first case is that of Mrs. Shirly Dinnerstein, in which the court
was asked if prior approval of a court was necessary to write an order
not to resuscitate a 67-year-old woman suffering from end-stage Alzheimer's disease and a variety of other disorders which left her confined
to bed in an "essentially vegetative state. "31 The Massachusetts Appeals

Court decided that where there was no real hope for the patient,
treatment would be in her best interests only if there "was some
reasonable expectation of effecting a permanent or temporary cure or

3o Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 2d 738 (1983).
31 Matter of Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
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relief from the illness or condition bei

least, a remission of symptoms enabling a

functioning, integrated existence" [emphas
court concluded that the question of the

order was "a question peculiarly within the
profession of what measures are appropri

passing of an irreversibly, terminally ill pati

history and condition and wishes of her famil

i.e., where the critical question is the m

withholding specific treatment based on it
patient, neither guardian nor court approv
The other two cases involved patients in

second case was a Florida case involving a term

Francis Landy, who had signed a "mercy
"irreversible coma" and "essentially vegetat
the specific question of whether, under th
pointment of a guardian was necessary to
under his "mercy will," the court held:

The right of a patient, who is in an ir

essentially vegetative state to refuse extr

measures, may be exercised either by his or

or by a guardian of the person of the p
court.

While the court insisted that judicial appointment of a legal

was not required, it did require that "at least two other p
certify that "the patient is in a permanent vegetative stat

In the third case, the Supreme Court of Washington w
explicitly to reconsider its requirement of a court-appointe

in Colyer.33 The case involved a 42-year-old severely mentally

gentleman who, as a result of pneumonia and hypoxemia
complete destruction of cerebral activity. He had no know
and was a ward of the state. Accordingly, appointment of
was required. On the other hand, the court accepted the r

32John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921

33 Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984).
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it reexamine its holding in Colyer, and modified it to conclude that
in cases of persistent vegetative state diagnosis, "guardianship proceed-

ings are [not] a necessary predicate to effective decision making." On
the other hand, in the absence of a court-appointed guardian, unanimous

agreement on the prognosis and treatment decision must be obtained

from "the immediate family [andi the treating physicians . . . to
protect against abuse and therefore eliminate the need for added
judicial oversight through the guardianship procedure in this limited
category of cases."34

These cases, and the vast majority of similar ones that never find
their way into court, demonstrate that there is still considerable
confusion regarding the necessity of a guardian in treatment-withholding

decisions. In the Earle Spring case, for example, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the history of guardianships in medical-

treatment decisions, and noted that in the past they had required
"consent or its equivalent" (sometimes using consent of a spouse as
"equivalent") for treatment decisions, and only turned to guardianships

when "consent or its equivalent" was not available. The court also
noted in passing the tradition of treating an unconsented-to treatment

as "battery" and opined that it might be more useful to view this
area of the law in terms of negligence." We think the court is on
the right track. For example, while it is a battery to treat someone
without their consent, it is certainly not a battery to refrain from
treating (or to withhold or withdraw treatment). It would seem more
reasonable to look at the withholding and withdrawal area as negligence.
The critical issue is thus not consent (although consent or its equivalent

might be required under certain circumstances), but negligence: i.e.,
is the treatment one that a reasonably prudent physician would not
give under the circumstances? If so, it may be appropriate to withhold

or withdraw such treatment without consent. For example, an incompetent patient could have a DNR order properly written without
a guardian's consent, if CPR was not something a reasonably prudent
physician would initiate under the circumstances. The next question
is whether the guardian, if needed, must apply for specific authority
to make medical treatment decisions.

34Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984).
35 In the Matter of Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980).
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The issue of requiring a legal guardian's d

in advance by a court was first raised in the Q

unnecessary), and raised shortly thereafter

involved a severely retarded 67-year-old m

state.36 He was diagnosed as having cancer
the recommended treatment. After a hearin
that Mr. Saikewicz would be better off wit

the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC

less than two months later. Two months l

died. It was another 14 months after his de

its now-famous opinion, which followed t
major particular except one.

The SJC rejected the Quinlan court's delegati

authority to an "ethics committee," even in
persistent vegetative state cases. It held tha

wanted a grant of immunity before withdraw

ment, such a grant could only be obtained
mentators and some courts read this case to mean that all decisions

by guardians to withdraw life-sustaining treatment must be approved
in advance by a court of law. In part because of this misinterpretation

of their holding, and subsequent confusion about it, the SJC clarified
its ruling in 1980 in the case of Earle Spring, the 77-year-old nursing
home resident with senile dementia whose family wanted him taken
off of kidney dialysis (his son had been appointed temporary guardian)

because they believed that was what he would want. On the specific
issue of whether it was always necessary for a guardian to seek prior
court approval of such a decision, the SJC was clear:
Our opinions should not be taken to establish any requirement of
prior judicial approval that would not otherwise exist.37
The most recent case on guardianship authority is the New Jersey
case of Claire Conroy.38 This case is important not only because it is
the most recent, but also because it is a carefully considered opinion

36 Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
37 In the Matter of Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
38 In the Matter of Claire Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
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by the same court that penned the Quinlan decision. Unfortunatel

this case has served to make treatment-withdrawal decisions by guardian

for elderly incompetent persons, at least those who are in nursin
homes, far more difficult in New Jersey. Indeed, almost a year aft
the decision, no treatments have been terminated on elderly patien
using the procedures defined in Conroy (Sullivan 1985).
The case was brought by Ms. Conroy's only living relative, a nephew

who had previously been appointed her legal guardian, who sough

an order to have her nasogastric feeding tube removed after her attendi

physician refused this request. The New Jersey Supreme Court he
that a legal guardian did have such authority without added cour

intervention, but only after a court had made a specific finding th
the ward was incompetent to consent or withhold consent for th

particular treatment in question. If such a determination has not be

made, and "if the patient already has a general guardian, the cou

should determine whether that guardian is a suitable person to represe

the patient with respect to the medical decision in question." Thi
will involve a court examination of the guardian's knowledge, mo
tivations, and possible conflicts of interest.
The court took special note of the New Jersey ombudsman statut
which was designed to help protect the rights of the institutionaliz
elderly in the state. Its decision, which it tried to limit to nursi
home residents, requires the guardian to notify the office of th

ombudsman whenever action to terminate treatment is "contemplated.

The ombudsman is instructed to treat such a notification as a possib

case of "abuse" and investigate it immediately. This investigation i

to include the appointment of two physicians, in addition to the
patient's attending physician, to examine the patient to confirm th

medical condition and prognosis. If all involved, including the om
budsman, agree that withdrawal would be what the ward would wa
in this circumstance, then the ward's wishes should be carried out
If such a decision cannot be reached then either of two best-interests

tests can be applied. Under the limited objective test, life-sustaini

treatment may be withdrawn if "there is some trustworthy eviden

that the patient would have refused the treatment, and . . . it is cle
that the burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatmen
outweigh the benefits of that life for him." Under the pure object
test (i.e., when there is no evidence about what the patient migh

want), "the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment should
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clearly outweigh the benefits that the pat

[and] the recurring, unavoidable and severe
with the treatment should be such that th
life-sustaining treatment would be inhuman

which centers on severe pain, is adopted bec

that "when evidence of a person's wishes or ph

is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, in f

and not to adopt this conservative posture "wo

risk for socially isolated and defenseless peopl

or mental handicaps." When either of these
family, including spouse, parents, and child

decision to withhold or withdraw life-susta

these steps are taken "in good faith," th
immunity for their actions.

There are a number of problems with th
First, it seems wholly unnecessary where t
explicit living will and designated a proxy

of attorney to carry out his wishes. Second,

persuasively in dissent, the "pure objective tes

on "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain

withholding or withdrawing treatment seem
be other negative considerations like prob

restraints, invasiveness, etc., in addition to
make continued treatment more burdensom

patient. Third, to require the ombudsma

withdrawal or withholding of treatment is abu

will likely discourage families and others from

even if doing so would fulfill the clear wishes

bound relative. Fourth, although the court a

problem in nursing home care is finding a

there, it requires not one, but three physician

and report on the patient's condition. One
suffice to confirm the medical condition and

many of the flaws in the Quinlan case have

persists in delegating its immunity-granting a

In Quinlan, the delegation was to an "ethic

properly been renamed a "prognosis committe

delegates immunity-granting authority to a
must concur, but need never meet: the guar
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two consulting physicians, the ombudsman; and, where either o
two best-interests tests are used, the patient's family or next of

These problems seem to flow from a too narrow reading of
facts. For example, pain was seen as a major issue by all parties
there was conflicting evidence about Ms. Conroy's pain at the

level. Pain is a major issue, but it should not be the only issue
central issue is, as the court makes clear in most of its opinion

wishes of the patient if they can be discerned, and, if not, the pat
best interests.

Likewise, the attempt to limit the opinion to encompass

nursing home patients is troubling and fatally flawed. It neglec
fact that all of the relevant medical decisions regarding Claire Conr

were made not in the nursing home at all, but during her four-mo

stay at the Clara Maas Hospital, where her nasogastric tub

inserted, removed, and reinserted, and where her guardian first requ

that it be permanently removed. The dichotomy between nur

home and hospital is not only artificial and misleading in Ms. Conr

case, it is artificial in the case of almost every elderly patient. Alm

all will be transferred to hospitals when they require invasive treatm

and a large number of them will initially enter the nursing hom

a hospital. The reasons provided by the court suggest a proced
that might be different in degree, but not so extreme as to se
up different in kind. The five reasons given are the patients' av
age; their lack of surviving parents, siblings, or children; the li

role of physicians in nursing homes; general understaffing and rep

of inhumane treatment; and the less urgent types of treatment de

that are made in nursing homes. Of these, the patient's age, fa

status, and needed treatment, are all unaffected by the physical se

This leaves the lack of physician contact and the general bad impre

one has about nursing homes as justifying different kinds of proced

Neither is sufficiently persuasive. Almost all previous nontrea
court cases have originated in hospitals, and this seems to be
setting in which patient wishes are most frequently ignored. T
are more treatment decisions per patient per day made in hosp

but the court gives us no reason to assume that they are mad
much better. By focusing on the nursing home setting, the c

tended to ignore the plight of Claire Conroy, just as the Quinlan co

wound up concentrating on physician liability and ignoring the int

of Karen Ann Quinlan herself (Annas 1985). Because of this f
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and the extremely complex procedural m
"New Jersey" solution is not likely to be
to follow.

Responsibility of Hospital and Phy
Refuses Life-sustaining Treatment

The thrust of almost all of the judicial d

grant prospective legal immunity to physici

of competent patients or their legal guardia

however, physicians may refuse to honor
patient. Traditional abandonment principl

another physician to care for these patien
care (Annas 1975).

Anticipating this problem, as noted above,

Court in the Quinlan case explicitly gave
the legal authority to seek out other ph
Competent patients, of course, retain the
individual physicians as well. But what if,
physicians cannot be found? Is the compet
at liberty to ignore the patient's wishes, o
to follow them even if following them
judgment or his conscience?

This difficult question was addressed direc

Bartling, a 70-year-old man confined to
intubated with a mechanical ventilator, w

be removed."9 His physicians, conceding
petent, nonetheless refused to remove the

cause his death and they did not think th

a physician to take. The hospital in which
Glendale Adventist Hospital, aggressively
went to court to argue against removal o
by Mr. Bartling's lawyer to find other p
successful because of the publicity gener

A lower court refused to order the physicia

39 Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr
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The day before the appeals court heard the case, Mr. Bartl

still in the hospital on the ventilator. Accordingly, the pri

the appeals court had to address was the obligation of a p
and hospital to fulfill the patient's wishes when transfer was

The court found that Mr. Bartling had a constitutionally g
right to refuse treatment and that the strongest argumen

physicians and hospital could make was that the hospital,
Adventist, was a "Christian, pro-life oriented hospital, the
of whose doctors would view disconnecting a life-support
a case such as this as inconsistent with the healing orient
physicians." The court, while not doubting the sincerity

ethical beliefs, was emphatic that in a conflict, the patient's in
paramount and must control:

If the right to self-determination as to his own medical t

is to have any meaning at all, it must be paramount to the i

of the patient's hospital and doctors. The right of a com

adult patient to refuse medical treatment is a constitutional

anteed right which must not be abridged.

Previous cases are in accord with this view.40 Indeed, the c

further in a footnote, saying that if Mr. Bartling was sti
would have issued the following order:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that William Francis Bar

the exercise of his right of privacy, may remain in defendan
or leave said hospital free of the mechanical respirator now

to his body and all defendants and their staffs are restra
interfering with Mr. Bartling's decision.

A majority of states now have "living will" statutes whic
a mechanism for a patient to refuse treatment after he o
longer competent. Using a document called a "living will"
declaration, a patient can set forth his or her wishes con
cessation or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment after

40Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (M

Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. App. 1978), Affd 379

(Fla. 1980).
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incompetent. In such cases it may happen tha

disagrees with their decision or refuses to

reasons. These statutes generally require th

patient to a physician who will carry out the

Likewise, the Uniform Rights of the Term
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in

August 1985 provides, in Section 6: "An Attending physician or
other health-care provider who is unwilling to comply with this Act
shall as promptly as practicable take all reasonable steps to transfer
care of the declarant to another physician or health-care provider."
This uniform act, and other living will statutes are discussed in detail
in the following section of this article.

Legislative Approaches to Withholding and Withdrawing
Life-sustaining Treatment for Elderly

Incompetent Patients

Recent debate has centered on four basic legislative approaches to
protecting the rights of adults in the context of medical treatment
decisions: "living will" statutes, durable power of attorney statutes,
guardianship, and adult protective services and public guardianship.
The last three are generic approaches designed to perform all or most
of the tasks needed by elderly or incompetent individuals. The first,
"living wills," is the only one specifically designed to permit a currently

competent individual to have some say about medical treatment after
the individual becomes incompetent to participate in treatment decisions.

Because of their generality, the last three schemes will be dealt with
rather cursorily, with major attention focused on living will proposals.

Guardianship
As specifically applied to medical treatment decisions, guardianship
has already been discussed in some detail. Some more general observations, however, seem appropriate as they relate to measures the
legislature might take to improve guardianship as a means to protect
patients. A guardian is a judicially appointed individual who makes
decisions on behalf of an incompetent individual, termed a ward. All
states have statutes that provide for the appointment of a guardian
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in certain circumstances under the state's parens patriae power. Al

the purpose of guardianship is to protect the ward, allegati

frequently made that the system often actually devalues the
who are viewed as useless and burdensome (Butler 1975; Nolan

Procedures differ between states, but, in general, a court
formally declare an individual incompetent to make certain d
in order to appoint a guardian to make decisions for him. W
number of guardianship petitions increasing sharply in recen
however, courts have been criticized for giving very little
each case, and often making determinations with little or no
and without the legal representation of the ward (Sherman

Dewey 1965).
A petition for guardianship may usually be filed by any interested
party, with notice sent to the alleged incompetent person. This notice

requirement can be waived by the judge in some jurisdictions, and
often is when the prospective ward is in a hospital. The quality of
the notice also varies, and may not convey what is at stake to the
alleged incompetent. The alleged incompetent is often not present at
the hearing, and is rarely represented by counsel. There is commonly

no evidence presented on his behalf (Regan 1985). This happens
although all states permit the alleged incompetent to be represented
by counsel.

The theory under which guardianship proceedings have become
one-sided, nonadversarial proceedings is that their intent is to protect
and benefit the ward, so an adversarial proceeding is not seen as needed

and is not deemed appropriate. This does not seem to reflect reality,
and a requirement of such representation would be much more protective

of the alleged incompetent.
The court may grant the guardian carefully defined "limited" or
"partial" powers to perform specific tasks or "plenary powers" to make

all decisions on behalf of the ward (Frolik 1981). The two can also
be "combined," as in the Quinlan case where her father sought both
plenary guardianship powers, and, in addition, specific authority to
order the removal of the ventilator.41 The guardian's plenary powers
have been divided into three areas: (1) disposition of the ward's financial

assets and income; (2) decisions about where and with whom the ward

41 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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will live; and (3) decisions about medica

Limited or partial guardianship statutes may

powers be delineated as narrowly as possi
may permit, but not require, such a narro
Wisconsin).

Once appointed, the guardian is usually o

consistent with the previously expressed valu

ward (substituted judgment) or alternativ
jectively in the "best interests" of the wa
incompetent individuals often have no fr
able to act as their guardian. This problem
of states to develop some form of "public
a government agency can function as a gu

Adult Protective Services and Public G

Adult protective services have their genes

specifically Titles VI and XX of the Social
definition was developed in 1975 under T
for Services to the Aged, Blind or Disabl

Protective services means a system of s
and legal services which are incidental t
are utilized to assist seriously impaired
because of mental or physical dysfuncti
their own resources, carry out the activ
protect themselves from neglect or haz
assistance from others and have no one
and able to assist them responsibly (45 C

In 1981, Title XX of the Social Securi

States for Social Services) encouraged the e
services for "adults unable to protect their

responded in various ways, many concentr
"elder abuse and neglect." In this sense, ad

the analog to "child abuse and neglect" pro

abuse and neglect in a specific portion of the

discussed, New Jersey's elder abuse schem
highest court as the appropriate method
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termination of treatment decisions involving elderly nursing home
patients in certain circumstances.42
Virtually all states provide some form of adult protective services
under Title XX (Burr 1982). The program consists of social service
intervention. When this is not sufficient, however, the courts will be

used to help "manage" the adult for his own benefit. When an
appropriate individual is not available to be appointed as a guardian,
a public agency may be utilized to fill this role.
Public guardianship generally refers to a state or local governmental
agency designated to act as guardian by the court in those cases where

the incompetent individual has no friends or relatives available to
serve in this capacity (Schmidt et al. 1981). Most states have explicit
or implicit statutory provision for public guardianship; some rely on
regulations and policies developed under their adult protection services

(Burr 1982; Schmidt et al. 1981). When a specific agency is appointed

to serve as a public guardian, it is usually the same agency that is
in charge of the ward's social welfare services, even though this presents

enormous potential conflict of interest (Schmidt et al. 1981). The
system could be greatly strengthened from the wards' perspective if
public guardianship agencies were completely independent of service
agencies, although some have suggested that the system can be so
repressive that it should be abolished altogether, and public agencies

limited to providing services to willing clients (Regan 1982).
Durable Power of Attorney
A power of attorney is a written instrument in which one person (the
principal) confirms the authority of another (the "attorney" or agent)

to perform specific tasks on the principal's behalf. In common law
the power of such an individual agent or attorney was automatically
revoked when the principal died or became legally incapacitated (Fowler

1974). This rule was designed to protect the principal's "right of
supervision" over the agent. Thus, an ordinary power of attorney
could not be used to delegate decision-making authority in the event
of mental incompetency, since the "triggering" event is simultaneously

the event that terminates the agent's authority to act (President's

42 In the Matter of Claire Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).

This content downloaded from
128.197.229.194 on Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:29:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rights of Elderly Patients 137

Commission for the Study of Ethical Pr
Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1983

terminated precisely when it became needed t

it could not be used for this purpose. This def

with formal petitioning for guardianship,

expense involved, prompted the search for a n

of a "durable power of attorney," i.e., an a
survived the later incapacity of the princip
A few states adopted the durable power of
But it was not until 1979 when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws included the "Uniform Durable

Power of Attorney Act" in the provisions of the Uniform Probate

Code (Effland 1975) that large numbers of states began to adopt
language identical or similar to that set forth in Section 5-501 et

seq. of the Uniform Probate Code. The operative section, 5-502,
provides:

All acts done by an attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable power
of attorney during any period of disability or incapacity of the
principal have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind
the principal and his successor in interest as if the principal were
competent and not disabled.

To avoid potential conflicts with a court-appointed guardian or
conservator, the Uniform Probate Code (Sec. 5-503) provides that the
guardian has the same power to revoke or amend the power of attorney

as the principal would have had if he were not incapacitated, and
that the court shall make appointment of a guardian in accordance
with the principal's most recent nomination (in a durable power of
attorney) except "for good cause or disqualification."
All 50 states now explicitly permit a principal to execute a durable
power of attorney by statute, with only the District of Columbia still

having no enabling legislation (Collin et al. 1984). The statutes do,
however, vary in some respects. Most notably, they either become
effective immediately ("immediate power") and remain unaffected by
subsequent incapacity of the principal, or, alternatively, they may be
permitted to take effect only upon the incapacitation of the principal
("springing power," i.e., springs into effectiveness upon incapacity)
(Collin et al. 1984).
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Nothing in their language in any way precludes or limits the use
of durable power of attorney statutes as a device for delegating medical

decision-making authority, and no court has ever ruled that they
possess such a limitation. The President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research

(1983, 147) noting the "flexibility of the statutes" that permits "directives

to be drafted that are sensitive both to the different needs of patients

in appointing proxy decisionmakers and to the range of situations in
which decisions may have to be made," encourages the use of existing

durable power of attorney statutes "to facilitate decision-making for

incapacitated persons." The commission did, however, note the "possibility of abuse inherent in the statutes" that did not contain even

the types of due process requirements of a guardianship petition.
Accordingly, it called for careful study of what additional safeguards

might be required based on experience with this device.
Procedural safeguards are important, but as the guardianship experience has demonstrated, they may add more to form than substance

in protecting the principal (Regan 1985). California, for example,
recently enacted a durable power of attorney statute specifically tailored

for medical decision making. Its provisions are so complex and cumbersome, however, that the statutory procedures are unlikely to be

used except in the most exceptional cases. Thus, while due process
may be achieved, the price is making the device almost useless. Other
states that have adopted statutes specifically dealing with the durable
power of attorney's application to medical decision making are Delaware,
Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Delaware's provisions are especially rigorous
in regard to the qualification of witnesses to the document, disqualifying

anyone related by blood or marriage, entitled to take any portion of
the principal's estate, financially responsible for medical care of the
principal, or employed by the hospital or facility in which the principal

is a patient.43 We believe the procedural problems can be remedied
in the medical treatment context by combining the durable power of
attorney with an explicit "living will." This is discussed in detail in
the section that follows.

43 Del. Code Ann. Title 16, Sec. 2503(b) (5) 1983.
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Living Will and Natural Death Act
Overview

The term "living will" was coined by Luis Kutner in 1969; it describes
a document in which a competent adult sets forth his wishes concerning
medical treatment in the event he becomes incapacitated in the future

(Kutner 1969). In this sense, it is like a "will," but since it takes
effect prior to death, it is termed a "living" will. More than five
million such documents have been distributed by Concern for Dying,

a New York educational organization, over the past decade. Public
interest is intense in this mechanism, but due to the absence of specific

judicial sanction, and the lack of clear rules regarding their execution

and use, many individuals and organizations, like the Society for the

Right to Die, have long advocated that states pass specific statutes
supporting the "living will."
California enacted the first living will statute in 1976, designating
it a "natural death act," a term that many other states have used as
well. California should receive considerable credit for enacting the
first statute, but the price was very high. The statute is extremely
narrow. A "binding" declaration can only be executed fourteen days
or more after the declarant has been diagnosed as suffering from a
terminal illness, making the person a "qualified patient." In order to
qualify as "terminal," death must be "imminent," i.e., the patient
must be dying soon whether or not life-sustaining procedures are used.

As the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behaviorial Research (1983, 142) has
noted, the fourteen-day waiting period under such circumstances requires

"a miraculous cure, a misdiagnosis, or a very loose interpretation of
the word 'imminent' in order for the directive to be of any use to
the patient."

Even though the California statute was inspired in part by the
Quinlan case, as Professor Alexander Capron (1978) has noted, the

statute does not apply to cases like hers because Karen was not
terminally ill and her death was not imminent:
The only patients covered by this statute are those who are on the
edge of death despite the doctors' efforts. The very people for whom
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the greatest concern is expressed about a prolonged and und
dying process are unaffected by the statute because their de

not imminent.

Most states have similar limitations on the individuals covered,

generally denoting them "terminally ill." This removes from their
protection the very categories of patients who are likely to need this
protection the most, patients like Earle Spring, William Bartling,
and Claire Conroy. As the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research

(1983, 142) noted, "such a limitation greatly reduces an act's potential."

By January 1985, 22 states and the District of Columbia had
enacted legislation; and by the end of 1986 at least 20 additional
states had enacted legislation on this subject. All of the statutes are
different and none is ideal. All statutes include specific instructions
which must be followed in the execution of an advanced directive,
and most set out a model directive in the statute itself. Some contain

California's "imminent" dying language, and some permit the declarant

to refuse only "artificial life-sustaining procedures."
Three states (Florida, Louisiana, and Virginia) expressly recognize
oral directives as well as written ones, while most of the others

expressly require a "writing." Four states (Arkansas, Illinois, Nevada,
and New Mexico) require that the declaration be executed in conformance

with the laws of the state regarding execution of a will. Almost all
statutes require the declarant to attest that he or she is of sound mind
at the time of the execution of the declaration, and more than a dozen
states require attestation to the voluntariness of the act as well (Gilmore

and Thorpe 1985).
Revocation is dealt with in all the statutes, but the circumstances
under which a declaration can be revoked vary, including cancellation,
destruction, written revocation, and oral revocation. Most states require

communication of the revocation to the attending physician as well.
Penalties for not following advance directives are few. The California
statute stipulates that a physician's failure to follow a binding declaration,

or transfer the patient to a physician who will, shall constitute unprofessional conduct. The Texas statute says only that such an act
may constitute unprofessional conduct. The vast majority of statutes
contain no penalties at all.
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Major Limitations of Current Statutes

In addition to their lack of uniformity, th

raises the question of the statutory differe
a state other than the one in which his declaration was executed.

Current "living will" statutes also suffer from the following genera
infirmities:

1. They are generally restricted to the terminally ill, and thus
exclude from their protection the vast majority of elderly individuals,
and the term "terminally ill" is so vague that it is subject to arbitrary

interpretation and application;
2. They generally limit the types of treatment a person can refus

to "artificial" or "extraordinary," thus excluding many burdensome

treatments, and the vagueness of these terms leads to arbitrar
interpretations;

3. They do not permit an individual to designate another person
to act on his behalf (like a durable power of attorney) and do not se
forth criteria under which the person so designated is to exercise this

authority, thus greatly restricting the usefulness of the document i

cases not precisely predicted by the individual;

4. They do not require health care providers to follow the patient'
wishes as set forth in the declaration, thus the rights of the patien

are not seen as superior to those of the health care providers;

5. They do not explicitly require health care providers to continue
palliative care to a patient who refuses other medical interventions

Because of these shortcomings, "living will" statutes are unlikely
to help resolve the many complex issues discussed in the previous

sections of this article. As presently drafted, what these statutes primaril

do is provide that if a patient is terminally ill, and if the physician

can do nothing to sustain the patient's life, and if the patient doe
not want his life sustained, and the doctor agrees with the patient'

decision, then the doctor may (but does not have to) follow the patient's

desire, and be assured criminal and civil immunity for his actions.
Two major approaches have been suggested to help remedy the
current unsatisfactory state of living will legislation: the approach o
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws

to draft a uniform act that clarifies existing legislation; and the approach

of the Legal Advisers of Concern for Dying, to draft a "second generation
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act that advances the rights of patients by directly addressing the
shortcomings discussed above.

The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws

charged its drafting committee to develop a uniform state living will
statute, but imposed a number of critical limitations. Most important,

the statute was to be limited to patients in a "terminal condition,"
and the use of proxies or a built-in durable power of attorney was
precluded. Accordingly, the act does not (and could not) deal with
these two critical limitations of the current statutes. The act also

restricts itself to competent adults, thus excluding mature minors

from its coverage, and limits the types of treatment that can be refused

to those that "serve only to prolong the dying process."
But developing a more useful or more comprehensive model statute
was not the drafting committee's purpose. Instead, as stated in their
final "draft for approval," the purposes of the uniform act are threefold:

(1) to encourage the effectiveness of a declaration in states other than

the state in which it is executed through uniformity of scope and
procedure, (2) to avoid the inconsistency in approach and quality

which have characterized the early statutes, and (3) to present an act
which is simple, effective, and acceptable to persons desiring to execute
a declaration and to physicians and health care facilities whose conduct
will be affected.

Goals 1 and 2 are modest and are, by definition, achieved by a
"uniform act." Goal 3, however, is much more elusive and although
the act is "simple" and "acceptable," its "effectiveness" depends upon
one's criteria for judgment. The full text of the act is set forth in
appendix 1.
Specific attention is drawn to the following provisions.
Two definitions merit comment. First, "life-sustaining treatment"
is defined as "any medical procedure or intervention that, when administered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the dying

process." The type of treatment a patient can refuse is thus limited
to those which only serve to "prolong the dying process." It is unlikely

there are any such treatments, and, if they exist, neither medical
ethics nor medical practice sanctions administering such "treatment"
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to a patient. Thus, if this definition is taken seriously

no or almost no application in the real world. Secon

condition" is defined as "an incurable or irreversible con

without the administration of life-sustaining treatment

opinion of the attending physician, result in death withi
short time." Like the California progenitor, and most o

statutes, this limitation to "terminally ill" patients drastica

the application of the statute, and will lead to all of th

caused by the term "imminent," since there is little, if any

between "imminent" death, and "death within a relatively s

It does, however, properly limit the use of this term

without "the administration of life-sustaining treatmen

requiring that death come soon "whether or not" treatment

The definitional limitations mean the act would not app

like Karen Quinlan, Earle Spring, Claire Conroy, or Will
The revocation section (3a) provides that "a declaratio
revoked at any time and in any manner by the declar

regard to mental or physical condition." This simply s
mistake. The revocation of a declaration by an incomp
or one unable to understand what he or she is doing sh
effective, since it negates the very essence of what the
promote: self-determination.

The pregnancy limitation section (5d) appears unconstitut

applied to the period of pregnancy prior to fetal viabi
reason for discriminating against terminally ill pregnan
this manner seems unjustified. Many statutes have simil
and all seem designed to deprive pregnant women of t
refuse treatment they would otherwise possess.
The transfer section (6) provides: "An attending physic
health-care provider who is unwilling to comply with t
as promptly as practicable take all reasonable steps to tr

the declarant to another physician or health-care provider."

be the heart of the act. Unfortunately it begs the relev
What do "all reasonable steps" mean, and what if after
the physician is still unable to transfer the patient? If
in taking the rights of patients seriously, the act shou
physician to either transfer "as promptly as practicable

out the wishes of the patient if transfer is not prompt
even if the health care provider disagrees with them.
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The second part of the immunity section (7b) provides: "A p

or other health-care provider, whose actions under this
accord with reasonable medical standards, is not subject to

or civil liability or discipline for unprofessional conduct." Thi

is extremely curious. It seems to permit the physician to d

he or she wants regardless of the patient's stated views in the d

as long as those actions "are in accord with reasonable medical

If this interpretation is correct, this provision invalidates

otherwise mandatory aspects of the act by permitting ph
do whatever is "in accord with reasonable medical standard

one must presume, was the law prior to enactment of the

Finally, there are penalties for failure to transfer, willfully
to record a determination, willfully concealing, cancelling or

or forging a declaration, etc. But there are no penalties fo

follow a declaration. This, of course, should be the whole p

act, and without a penalty for failure to follow the declarant'

physicians are left in the same "optional" position they we
to the act.

In short, while the act does provide a uniform approach, it is not
a particularly useful one since it severely limits its application to tiny

categories of patients and treatments. Moreover, it does not provide
for a proxy or setting standards for proxy decision making; does not
require health professionals to follow the terms of the declaration; and

does not explicitly require the provision of palliative care. Thus, the
act addresses only one major shortcoming of current laws: the lack
of uniformity. It leaves the other five major shortcomings intact;
worse, it seems to institutionalize and approve them.

The Right to Refuse Treatment Act
In addition to the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, three
other major model statutes have been developed on the subject of
consent to medical treatment. All were reviewed and discussed by
the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in

Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1983, 147-48).
The first, the Society for the Right to Die's "Medical Treatment
Decision Act" is substantially identical to many of the existing natural
death acts and so shares their problems. As the President's Commission
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described it, it "shares the narrowness

acts and makes no explicit provision for des

decision making."
The second proposal is, like the Unifor
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It is entitled

a "Model Health Care Consent Act." Unfortunately, despite its title,
it does not have consent as its central concern. As the President's

Commission correctly noted, it should more accurately be described
as a "substitute authority to decide act." And even in this area it is
extremely narrow and "imprecise." The President's Commission properly

criticized it for failure to provide any guidance on what standard a
proxy should use in making health care decisions, imprecision in the
determination of capacity to consent, and uncertain provisions regarding

revocation and redelegation of authority. A leading commentator de-

scribed it as "confused and ultimately misguided," and thought it
could be more accurately entitled "The Summer Camp Health Care
Act" (Capron 1983). It does not address the major issues discussed
in this article.

The third proposal is the "Right to Refuse Treatment Act," a
"second generation" living will act developed by the Legal Advisers
Committee of Concern for Dying and set forth in its entirety in

appendix 2 (Concern for Dying. Legal Advisers Committee 1983;
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1983, 428-31). Of this act
the President's Commission wrote:

The Act enunciates competent adults' right to refuse treatment and

provides a mechanism by which competent people can both state
how they wish to be treated in the event of incompetence and name
another person to enforce those wishes. In terms of its treatment of
such central issues as the capacity to consent and the standard by which
a proxy decision-maker is to act, the Uniform Right to Refuse Treatment
Act is carefully crafted and in conformity with the Commission's conclusions.

Greater opportunity for review of determinations of incompetency
and of proxy's decisions may be needed, however, to protect patients'

self-determination and welfare [emphasis added].
The act has been introduced in the Florida and Massachusetts

legislatures. Following a lower court decision in Massachusetts in the
case of Paul Brophy, a 43-year-old former fire fighter and EMT, which
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refused to permit the withdrawal of artificial nutrition via a gastrostomy

tube on Mr. Brophy although he was in a persistent vegetative state,
and despite a judicial finding that he would refuse such artificial
feeding if he was competent, the Boston Globe editorially recommended

the act to the state legislature. This recommendation was based on
the fact that unlike other current statutes and proposals, the act would
specifically permit patients to refuse any treatment, including artificial

feeding, through a living will and/or designation of a proxy to make
this decision consistent with their desires. The lower court decision

was reversed in 1986 and the hospital ordered to transfer Mr. Brophy

to a facility that would comply with his wishes.44
Most sections of the Right to Refuse Treatment Act are self-ex-

planatory, but some deserve specific comment. No model form or
document is included, because the drafters believed that the individual's

wishes would be more likely to be precisely expressed if they were
required to be set forth in his own words. The right affirmed by the

act is the right to refuse treatment, as viewed as implicit in any
meaningful concept of individual liberty. Living will statutes, on the

other hand, have often relied on a vaguely articulated "right to die"
notion that has no legal pedigree. Both adults and mature minors are
included in the purview of the act, because the drafters believed that

minors who understand and appreciate the nature and consequences
of their actions should be afforded self-determination and not forced

to undergo medical treatment against their will.
To meet the objections of narrowness in the other acts, this act
aims at protecting the autonomy of all competent individuals, not
just those who have been diagnosed as "terminally ill," because all
persons merit respect and autonomy. Moreover, if we do not raise
our sensitivity regarding respect for the nonterminally ill patient's
right to autonomy, it is extremely unlikely that the rights of terminally

ill patients will be afforded respect. The act would also apply to
patients like Karen Ann Quinlan and Paul Brophy, who although in
hopeless, persistent vegetative states, did not suffer from an underlying,

terminal illness. It would also apply to patients like Earle Spring and

William Bartling (Concern for Dying. Legal Advisers Committee
1983).

44 In re Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
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The most critical definition in the act is
which is defined as the ability to "understa

ture and consequences of a decision to accept o

President's Commission for the Study of Eth

and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (19

combining a proxy directive with specific i

could control both the content and the pr
about care in case of incapacity." The act inc

by permitting the declarant to define bot

refused (including artificial feeding), and to na

to make decisions consistent with his de
declaration.

The Right to Refuse Treatment Act recognizes that some health
care providers may have different belief systems than their patients,
and attempts to outline a realistic transfer procedure that respects the

ethical views of both parties. The act recognizes, however, that the
patient is most immediately affected by the treatment-refusal decision,

since the patient's own future and quality of living and dying is at
stake. Consequently, it provides that a patient's directive must prevail
over the physician's views in the rare occasion where transfer is impossible.

This may seem harsh, but the drafters believed that the balance
between the physician's personal ethics (or the ethics of the medical

profession) and the liberty interest of the patient would always be
tipped in the patient's favor by the patient's interest in being free
from nonconsensual medical interventions.45
Providers who follow the procedures outlined in the act are relieved

of liability under any civil, criminal, or administrative action. On
the other hand, providers who abandon their patients or refuse to
comply with valid declarations are subject to punishment. These
offenders may face civil actions including charges of negligence and
battery, and administrative sanctions including license revocation and
suspension.

Other important sections of the act make it clear that this method
of refusing treatment is not exclusive, that refusal of treatment is not

suicide, does not affect insurance policies, and that regardless of

4 Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984).
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refusals, palliative care must be given unless it is specifically refus

by the patient. No time limit is placed on the validity of the declaration

just as there is no time limit on ordinary wills or on donations ma
under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Nonetheless, those who

worry that the declaration might not reflect the currently held views

of the patient will want to add some provision for updating or reaffirmi

one's advance declaration. The primary protection regarding the wishes

of the patient is the requirement for two witnesses to certify that the

believe the person understood what he was signing and did so voluntarily
The drafters did not restrict the individuals who can either be witnesses

or authorized persons, because they believed this unnecessarily implied
bad faith on the part of whole categories of individuals (e.g., relatives,

those making the will, health providers), and unnecessarily restricts
the autonomy of an individual to pick his own witnesses and proxies.

Those who disagree with this analysis, as the President's Commission
may have, will want to consider disqualifying certain individuals who
seem to have a built-in conflict of interest with the declarant.

An additional protection of the declarant is that revocation is made

simple. But the intent to revoke must be specific. Merely signing a
blanket hospital admissions form that "consents" to whatever treatment
physicians at the hospital may wish to render is insufficient indication
of revocation of a declaration. While a relative may sabotage a patient's

wishes (by reporting a verbal revocation that did not in fact take
place), the act relies on good faith and criminal penalties to discourage
this practice.

In summary, the act is designed to promote the autonomy of
competent individuals and respect for their decisions by enhancing
their right to accept or reject medical treatments recommended by
their health care providers. It protects all patients who were once
competent, both while they are competent, and, if they execute a
declaration, after they become incompetent. It provides that patients
may execute a written, signed declaration setting forth their intentions

on treatment and refusal decisions and permits them to designate
authorized individuals to make treatment decisions on their behalf

should they become incompetent in the future. The act upholds and
clarifies recognized patient rights consistent with the ethics of the
medical profession and shields complying physicians, witnesses, and
authorized persons acting in good faith from legal liability and provides

penalties for those who violate its provisions.
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Of course, there are major limitations to th

it applies only to competent individuals wh

while competent, or actually execute a dec
It does not apply to those individuals who
to formerly competent individuals who ne

Thus, it leaves the issue of what to do
individuals unresolved.

Conclusion

The individual's right to self-determination in deciding whether to
accept recommended medical care hinges upon the doctrine of informed

consent and the constitutional right of privacy. The appellate courts

have been remarkably consistent in enunciating and enforcing this
right, and in permitting competent individuals to refuse any medical
intervention. For the elderly patient the right to self-determination
is often lost due to a health care provider's or trial court's wrongful
assumption of incompetence. To protect the elderly, their competence
must be judged on the same basis as everyone else's: an ability to
understand and appreciate the information needed to give an informed
consent. The appellate courts are in accord on these issues, and current

debate continues primarily around defining when, if ever, the state
has a sufficiently compelling interest in forcing treatment on a patient.

Pregnancy and child-dependency have been the major such potential
interests cited, but neither is likely to apply to the elderly. Although
their rights are clear, the remedy is often difficult, especially when
the health care provider refuses to either follow the patient's decisions

or transfer the patient. While courts will enforce the rights of the
patient, health care providers should honor patient decisions without
resort to the courts. Appropriate legislation might serve both to codify

existing rights, and to clarify mechanisms to enforce and enhance
them.
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Appendix 1
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
Section 1. Definitions
In this [Act]:
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician who has primary
responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient.

(2) "Declaration" means a writing executed in accordance with the
requirements of Section 2(a).
(3) "Health-care provider" means a person who is licensed, certified,

or otherwise authorized by the law of this State to administer

health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a
profession.

(4) "Life-sustaining treatment" means any medical procedure or
intervention that, when administered to a qualified patient,
will serve only to prolong the dying process.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate,

trust, partnership, association, government, governmental sub-

division or agency, or any other legal entity.

(6) "Physician" means an individual [licensed to practice medicine
in this State].
(7) "Qualified patient" means a patient [181 years of age or older
who has executed a declaration and who has been determined

by the attending physician to be in a terminal condition.
(8) "State" means a state, territory, possession, or commonwealth
of the United States and the District of Columbia.

(9) "Terminal condition" means an incurable or irreversible condition

that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment,
will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in death
within a relatively short time.

Section 2. Declaration Relating to Use of
Life-sustaining Treatment
(a) Any individual of sound mind and [ 181 years of age or older
may at any time execute a declaration governing the withholding
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or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatmen

be signed by the declarant, or another at t

and witnessed by 2 individuals.
(b) A declaration may, but need not, be i

Declaration
If I should have an incurable or irreversible condition

that will cause my death within a relatively short time, and if

I am no longer able to make decisions regarding my medical
treatment, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to the

I Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act),

to withhold or withdraw treatment that only prolongs the dying
process and is not necessary to my comfort or to alleviate pain.

Signed

this

day

of

Signature
Address

The declarant voluntarily signed this writing in my presence.
Witness

Address
Witness

Address

(c) A physician or other health-care provider who is provided a
copy of the declaration shall make it a part of the declarant's
medical record and, if unwilling to comply with its provisions,
promptly so advise the declarant.

Section 3. Revocation of Declaration
(a) A declaration may be revoked at any time and in any manner
by the declarant without regard to mental or physical condition.

A revocation is effective upon communication to the attending
physician or other health-care provider by the declarant or by
another who witnessed the revocation.

(b) The attending physician or other health-care provider shall make

the revocation a part of the declarant's medical record.
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Section 4. Recording Determination of Terminal

Condition and Declaration

Upon determining that the declarant is in a terminal condition,
the attending physician who knows of a declaration shall record the
determination and the terms of the declaration in the declarant's
medical record.

Section 5. Treatment of Qualified Patients
(a) A qualified patient has the right to make decisions regarding
life-sustaining treatment as long as the patient is able to do
SO.

(b) A declaration becomes operative when (1) the declaration is
communicated to the attending physician and (2) the declarant

is determined by the attending physician to be in a terminal
condition and no longer able to make decisions regarding administration of life-sustaining treatment. When the declaration

becomes operative, the attending physician and other healthcare providers shall act in accordance with its provisions or
comply with the transfer provisions of Section 6.

(c) This [Act] does not affect the responsibility of the attending
physician or other health-care provider to provide treatment,
including nutrition and hydration, for comfort, care, or alleviation

of pain.

(d) Unless the declaration otherwise provides, the declaration of a
qualified patient known to the attending physician to be pregnant

shall be given no force or effect as long as it is probable that
the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with continued

application of life-sustaining treatment.

Section 6. Transfer of Patients
An attending physician or other health-care provider who is unwilling

to comply with this [Act] shall as promptly as practicable take all
reasonable steps to transfer care of the declarant to another physician
or health-care provider.

This content downloaded from
128.197.229.194 on Tue, 14 Dec 2021 14:29:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rights of Elderly Patients '53
Section 7. Immunities
(a) In the absence of knowledge of the revocation of a declaration,
a person is not subject to civil or criminal liability or discipline
for unprofessional conduct for carrying out the declaration pursuant

to the requirements of this [Act].
(b) A physician or other health-care provider, whose actions under

this [Act] are in accord with reasonable medical standards, is
not subject to criminal or civil liability or discipline for unprofessional conduct.
Section 8. Penalties

(a) A physician or other health-care provider who willfully fails
to transfer in accordance with Section 6 is guilty of [a class

misdemeanor].
(b) A physician who willfully fails to record the determination of
terminal condition in accordance with Section 4 is guilty of [a

class misdemeanor].

(c) An individual who willfully conceals, cancels, defac
the declaration of another without the declarant's consent or
who falsifies or forges a revocation of the declaration of another

is guilty of [a class misdemeanor].
(d) An individual who falsifies or forges the declaration of another,

or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a re-

vocation as provided in Section 3, is guilty of [a class
misdemeanor].
(e) Any person who requires or prohibits the execution of a declaration

as a condition for being insured for, or receiving, health-care

services shall be guilty of [a class misdemeanor].

(f) Any person who coerces or fraudulently induces another to

execute a declaration under this [Act] shall be guilty of [a class
misdemeanor].

(g) The sanctions provided in this section do not displace any
sanction applicable under other law.

Section 9. General Provisions
(a) Death resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment pursuant to a declaration and in accordance
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with this [Act] does not constitute, for any purpose,

or homicide.

(b) The making of a declaration pursuant to Section 2 does not
affect in any manner the sale, procurement, or issuance of any

policy of life insurance or annuity, nor does it affect, impair,
or modify the terms of an existing policy of life insurance or

annuity. A policy of life insurance or annuity is not legally
impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an insured qualified

patient, notwithstanding any term to the contrary.
(c) A person may not prohibit or require the execution of a declaration

as a condition for being insured for, or receiving, health-care
services.

(d) This [Act] creates no presumption concerning the intention of
an individual who has revoked or has not executed a declaration

with respect to the use, withholding, or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment in the event of a terminal condition.
(e) This [Act] does not affect the right of a patient to make decisions
regarding use of life-sustaining treatment so long as the patient
is able to do so, or impair or supersede any right or responsibility

that any person has to effect the withholding or withdrawal of
medical care.

(f) Nothing in this [Act] shall require any physician or other health-

care provider to take any action contrary to reasonable medical
standards.

(g) This [Act] does not condone, authorize, or approve mercykilling or euthanasia.

Section 10. Presumption of Validity of Declaration
A physician or other health-care provider may presume, in the
absence of knowledge to the contrary, that a declaration complies
with this [Act] and is valid.

Section 11. Recognition of Declaration Executed in

Another State

A declaration executed in another state in compliance with the law
of that state or this state is validly executed for purposes of this [Act].
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Section 12. Effect of Prior Declarations
An instrument executed before the effective date of this [Act] that

substantially complies with Section 2(a) shall be given effect pursuant

to the provisions of this [Act].

Section 13. Severability
If any provision of this [Act] or its application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions

or applications of this [Act] which can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this
[Act) are severable.

Section 14. Time of Taking Effect
This [Act] takes effect on

Section 15. Uniformity of Construction and Application
This [Act) shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this
[Act) among states enacting it.

Section 16. Short Title
This [Act] may be cited as the Uniform Rights of the Terminally
Ill Act.

Section 17. Repeal
The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:
(1)
(2)
(3)
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Appendix 2
Right to Refuse Treatment Act
Section 1. Definitions
"Competent person" shall mean an individual who is able to understand

and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to accept or
refuse treatment.

"Declaration" shall mean a written statement executed according
to the provisions of this Act which sets forth the declarant's intentions

with respect to medical procedures, treatment or nontreatment, and
may include the declarant's intentions concerning palliative care.
"Declarant" shall mean an individual who executes a declaration

under the provisions of this Act.

"Health care provider" shall mean a person, facility or institution
licensed or authorized to provide health care.
"Incompetent person" shall mean a person who is unable to understand

and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision to accept or
refuse treatment.

"Medical procedure or treatment" shall mean any action taken by

a physician or health care provider designed to diagnose, assess, or
treat a disease, illness, or injury. These include, but are not limited
to, surgery, drugs, transfusions, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, resuscitation, artificial feeding, and any other medical act designed for
diagnosis, assessment or treatment.
"Palliative care" shall mean any measure taken by a physician or
health care provider designed primarily to maintain the patient's
comfort. These include, but are not limited to, sedatives and painkilling drugs; non-artificial, oral feeding; suction; hydration; and hygienic
care.

"Physician" shall mean any physician responsible for the d
care.

Section 2.
A competent person has the right to refuse any medical procedure
or treatment, and any palliative care measure.
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Section 3.

A competent person may execute a declara
holding or withdrawal of any medical proc
palliative care measure, which is in use or
in the person's medical care or treatment,

medical procedure or treatment could prevent

death from being caused by the person's d

The declaration shall be in writing, dated an

in the presence of two adult witnesses. Th
the declaration, and by their signatures i

declarant's execution of the declaration was un

Section 4.
If a person is unable to sign a declaration due to a physical impairment,

the person may execute a declaration by communicating agreement
after the declaration has been read to the person in the presence of
the two adult witnesses. The two witnesses must sign the declaration,
and by their signatures indicate the person is physically impaired so
as to be unable to sign the declaration, that the person understands
the declaration's terms, and that the person voluntarily agrees to the
terms of the declaration.

Section 5.
A declarant shall have the right to appoint in the declaration a
person authorized to order the administration, withholding, or with-

drawal of medical procedures and treatment in the event that the
declarant becomes incompetent. A person so authorized shall have the
power to enforce the provisions of the declaration and shall be bound
to exercise this authority consistent with the declaration and the
authorized person's best judgment as to the actual desires and preferences

of the declarant. No palliative care measure may be withheld by an
authorized person unless explicitly provided for in the declaration.
Physicians and health care providers caring for incompetent declarants
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shall provide such authorized persons all medical information which
would be available to the declarant if the declarant were competent.

Section 6.
Any declarant may revoke a declaration by destroying or defacing
it, executing a written revocation, making an oral revocation, or by
any other act evidencing the declarant's specific intent to revoke the
declaration.

Section 7.
A competent person who orders the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment shall receive appropriate palliative care unless it is expressly

stated by the person orally or through a declaration that the person
refuses palliative care.

Section 8.

This act shall not impair or supersede a person's legal right to
direct the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment or procedures

in any other manner recognized by law.

Section 9.
No person shall require anyone to execute a declaration as a condition
of enrollment, continuation, or receipt of benefits for disability, life,
health or any other type of insurance. The withdrawal or withholding
of medical procedures or treatment pursuant to the provisions of this
Act shall not affect the validity of any insurance policy, and shall not
constitute suicide.
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Section 10.

This Act shall create no presumption concerning the intention of
a person who has failed to execute a declaration. The fact that a person
has failed to execute a declaration shall not constitute evidence of that

person's intent concerning treatment or nontreatment.

Section 11.
A declaration made pursuant to this Act, an oral refusal by a person,
or a refusal of medical procedures or treatment through an authorized

person, shall be binding on all physicians and health care providers
caring for the declarant.

Section 12.
A physician who fails to comply with a written or oral declaration
and to make necessary arrangements to transfer the declarant to another

physician who will effectuate the declaration shall be subject to civil
liability and professional disciplinary action, including license revocation

or suspension. When acting in good faith to effectuate the terms of
a declaration or when following the direction of an authorized person

appointed in a declaration under Section 5, no physician or health
care provider shall be liable in any civil, criminal, or administrative
action for withholding or withdrawing any medical procedure, treatment,

or palliative care measure. When acting in good faith, no witness to
a declaration, or person authorized to make treatment decisions under

Section 5, shall be liable in any civil, criminal, or administrative
action.

Section 13.
A person found guilty of willfully concealing a declaration, or
falsifying or forging a revocation of a declaration, shall be subject to
criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor fthe class or type of misdemeanor

is left to the determination of individual state legislatures].
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Section 14.
Any person who falsifies or forges a declaration, or who willfully
conceals or withholds information concerning the revocation of a declaration, with the intent to cause a withholding or withdrawal of life-

sustaining procedures from a person, and who thereby causes lifesustaining procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to be
hastened, shall be subject to criminal prosecution for a felony [the
class or type of felony is left to the determination of individual state

legislatures].

Section 15.
If any provision or application of this Act is held invalid, this
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application,

and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
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